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(Under the direction of B. Keith Payne and Kristen A. Lindquist) 
 
The perception of eeriness in old house is part of the experience of fear. I draw from prior work 
in philosophy and affective science to argue that affect can be experienced as a property of one’s 
internal state (self-focused) or as a perceived property in the external world (world-focused). As 
of yet, there has been no published empirical work examining self-focused vs. world-focused 
affect, nor is there any empirical work examining the mechanisms through which self-focused 
vs. world-focused affect arise and their consequences for subjective experiences and behavior. I 
conducted three studies to empirically examine self-focused vs. world-focused affect. Study 1 
investigated whether self-focused and world-focused affect are experienced differently using 
self-report measures. Study 2 expanded on the findings of Study 1 by using direct and indirect 
measures of affect. Finally, Study 3 investigated whether self-focused vs. world-focused affect 
led to differences in regulation of affect vs. behavioral avoidance. Study 3 also investigated 
attention as a key mechanism that gives rise to self-focused vs. world-focused affect. Across 
these three studies I find evidence that self-focused (vs. world-focused affect) may be less 
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Things in the world often seem imbued with emotional properties. A creaky old house is 
eerie. A hot cup of coffee is delightful. A rainy day is dreary. People often recognize that 
eeriness, delightfulness, or dreariness are matters of perception. Another person might find the 
same house intriguing, the same cup of coffee unappetizing, or the same day serene. However, 
people may not recognize that these perceived properties are part of an affective experience. 
Creaky old houses are perceived as eerie because the perceiver experiences fear in the house. 
Similarly, coffee may be perceived as delightful because the perceiver experiences pleasure and 
increased arousal after having a cup. And, rainy days are seen as dreary because the perceiver 
experiences boredom from being cooped up inside during a rainstorm. 
Several theories of emotion (e.g., Barrett, Mesquita, Ochsner, & Gross 2007; Dewey, 
1895; Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001; Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Lindquist, 2013; 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2008) predict that affect can be experienced as a property of one’s an 
internal state (self-focused affect) or as a perceived property of the external world (world-focused 
affect). Self-focused affect (e.g., “I feel sad”) and world-focused affect (e.g., “That situation is 
tragic”) are different ways of experiencing the same affective state. However, little empirical 
work has directly examined self-focused vs. world-focused affect, or their implications for 
subjective experience and behavior. Still, much indirect evidence exists: many studies in 
affective science suggest that affect may be experienced as self-focused, whereas research on 
intergroup bias, and judgment and decision making provide evidence that affect may be 
experienced as world-focused. 
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Evidence for Self-Focused Affect 
Self-focused affect refers to what people typically recognize as affective experiences. 
People commonly talk about “feeling sad” or “being angry.” Similarly, researchers often ask 
participants to make self-focused ratings about their affective valence (e.g., “I feel bad” or “I’m 
riled up”) or experiences of discrete emotion (e.g., “I feel sad” or “I’m afraid”). Self-focused 
affect falls into a category of conscious experience that philosophers have referred to as second-
order or reflective consciousness (e.g., Chalmers, 1996; Legrand, 2007). Self-focused affect is 
defined as affect that is experienced as a property of the self (Barrett et al., 2007; Lambie, 2009; 
Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Lindquist, 2013). In self-focused affect, one’s affective state is in the 
foreground of attention.  
Many studies in psychology measure self-focused affect, likely because affective 
experiences are often assumed to be self-focused phenomena. For example, researchers often use 
self-report measures that have participants make ratings about their current affective state, such 
as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) or the Self-
Assessment Manikin (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Additionally, in studies that induce affect, 
researchers typically assume that participants are being induced to feel an instance of self-
focused affect. In these studies, researchers show participants an evocative stimulus or have 
participants recall a prior affective experience. Then, researchers ask participants to make self-
focused reports on their affective state to test the effectiveness of the affect induction procedure. 
For example, in one study, researchers examined participants’ affective responses to different 
film clips (Gross & Levenson, 1995). After watching each clip, participants made self-focused 
ratings about whether they felt any of 16 different emotions (e.g., amusement, anger, 
contentment, fear, etc.). Similarly, any study that uses a “manipulation check” for emotion is also 
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measuring self-focused affect. For instance, in another study, researchers induced anxiety by 
instructing participants to prepare a three-minute speech within one minute (Tugade & 
Fredrickson, 2004). Afterward, the researchers had participants make self-focused ratings about 
their current feelings of anxiety as a manipulation check. Thus, affective science offers an 
abundance of evidence that affect can be self-focused. 
Evidence for World-Focused Affect 
Whereas a great deal of research in affective science has explored self-focused 
experiences of affect, another category of affective experiences exist: world-focused affect. 
World-focused affect reflects a category of conscious experience that philosophers have referred 
to as first-order, non-reflective, pre-reflective, or phenomenal consciousness (e.g., Chalmers, 
1996; Legrand, 2007). World-focused affect is defined as affect that is experienced as a property 
in the world, rather than as a property of the self (Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002). 
Seeing tragedy as a part of a funeral would be an experience of world-focused sadness. The 
perceiver’s experience of sadness is perceived to be a property inherent in an event (e.g., tragedy 
inherent in loss) rather than an affective state (e.g., sadness). Because world-focused affect is 
experienced as a property in the world, researchers typically assume that experiences of world-
focused affect are not affective at all. Indeed, they are often considered to be “cognitive” 
phenomena such as perceptions, attitudes, or appraisals. 
For example, some models posit that self-focused affect acts as a trigger for world-
focused affect (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). According to these models, instances of self-
focused fear cause world-focused perceptions of danger. For instance, participants induced to 
feel fear perceived the risk of a terrorist attack to be higher than participants induced to feel 
anger (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003). Conversely, appraisal (e.g., Roseman, 2011; 
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Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990) and basic emotion models (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 1993), have 
posited that world-focused affect triggers self-focused affect. These models posit that detection 
of threat (Ekman, 1992, 1993) or appraisals of threat (Roseman, 2011; Roseman et al., 1990) 
subsequently trigger self-focused experiences of fear. In contrast, other models of emotion 
(Barrett et al., 2007; Clore et al., 2001; Dewey, 1895; Lindquist, 2013) as well as philosophical 
theories (Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002) have argued that self-focused and world-
focused affect are merely different forms that the same affective experience may take.  
As with self-focused affect, many studies unknowingly measure world-focused affect. 
However, evidence for world-focused affect comes from research that does not directly measure 
affective experiences, but rather from research that examines evaluative states more generally. 
Specifically, two separate lines of research examine how affect can be experienced as world-
focused. One line of evidence comes from work on intergroup bias, which suggests that affect 
can be experienced as world-focused perceptions of threat from an outgroup (e.g., seeing Black 
Americans as threatening; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Lee et al., 2018). A second 
line of evidence comes from work in judgment and decision-making, which suggests that affect 
can also be perceived as world-focused properties of a situation, such as danger inherent in an 
activity (e.g., perceiving nuclear power as risky; Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Slovic, 1996). 
World-focused negative affect as intergroup bias. Intergroup bias offers an example of 
how affect may be experienced as world-focused. Negative affect toward outgroups is thought to 
play a central role in intergroup bias (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devine, Plant, Amodio, 
Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, 2004; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & 
Williams, 1995; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982, 1983; 
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McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2003). This negative affect toward an 
outgroup is often experienced as property of the group, rather than one’s as affective state. 
Theories such as aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, 2004; Gaertner & Dovidio, 
1986), modern racism (McConahay, 1982, 1983; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) and 
symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears, 1988) argue that negative affect toward 
outgroups is often experienced as world-focused. These theories argue that negative affect drives 
many Americans’ opposition to policies benefiting traditionally marginalized groups in the 
United States (e.g., Black Americans). This opposition often takes the form of criticism that 
policies providing redress to marginalized groups (e.g., affirmative action, welfare) violate 
traditional American values such as having a strong work ethic, individualism, and self-reliance 
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1983; McConahay & Hough, 
1976). 
Measures of symbolic racism, aversive racism, and modern racism often predict 
opposition to affirmative action (Awad, Cokley, & Ravitch, 2005; McConahay, 1983; Little, 
Murry, & Wimbush, 1998; but see Bobo, 1998), opposition to busing students to different school 
districts as a method to desegregate schools (McConahay, 1982; Sears, Hensler, & Speer, 1979; 
but see Bobo, 1983), and decisions to hire outgroup members or not (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; 
McConahay, 1983). In other words, Americans who possess negative affect toward outgroups 
tend to express their negative affect in world-focused, rather than self-focused ways. These 
individuals may want to avoid self-focused negative affect toward outgroups (e.g., personal 
animus), because it would be inconsistent with important American values such as fairness or 
equality. Instead, individuals might be motivated to make world-focused evaluations. For 
example, these individuals might make judgments about the unfairness or favoritism inherent in 
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policies such as Affirmative Action. Similarly, these individuals might also perceive laziness or 
lack of American values in the outgroup. In both cases, negative affect toward an outgroup is 
experienced as perceived negative properties of policies (e.g., “Affirmative Action is unfair”) or 
the outgroup (e.g., “Black people are lazy”). 
Yet, it can be argued that work on aversive racism, modern racism, and symbolic racism 
(e.g., Awad et al., 2005; Dovodio & Gaertner, 2000; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Little et al., 1998; 
McConahay, 1982, 1983; McConahay et al., 1981) does not demonstrate that experience 
negative affect as world-focused. Rather, one might argue that this research only demonstrates 
that people express their negative affect toward outgroup members in world-focused ways. 
However, several studies provide evidence that negative affect can be experienced as perceived 
threat on the faces of outgroup members (e.g., Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; 
Hutchings & Haddock, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2009). These studies offer evidence that participants 
experienced their negative affect toward outgroup members as world-focused perceptions: 
participants with more negative affect saw faces from the outgroup as angrier. 
In one study, White participants watch animated faces of Black and White individuals as 
they shifted from neutral to angry expressions (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). Participants 
were instructed to stop the animation the moment they perceived anger on each face. Afterward, 
researchers measured participants’ negative affect toward Black individuals using an implicit 
measure. Participants with greater negative affect toward Black individuals tended to be faster at 
identifying anger on Black, compared to White faces. 
In a second study by the same researchers, participants watched animated faces of Black 
and White individuals transition from angry to neutral (Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003). In 
this study, participants indicated when they could no longer perceive anger on the Black and 
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White faces. Then, participants completed an implicit measure of negative affect toward Black 
Americans. The researchers found that participants with greater negative affect took longer to 
identify the point at which anger disappeared from Black, compared to White faces. Thus, for 
participants with greater negative affect, the perception of anger tended to linger on Black faces, 
but not White faces. Participants’ responses in this and other studies (Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008; Shapiro et al., 2009) demonstrate that 
negative affect toward an outgroup may be experienced as a property of the outgroup (e.g., 
expressions of threat). Thus, many forms of bias against outgroups (e.g., opposition to political 
advancement, perceptions of threat) may be experiences of world-focused negative affect. 
Perceptions of risk and benefit as instances of world-focused affect. World-focused 
affect also can take the form of perceived risk and benefit. For example, the risk-as-feelings 
model (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001) and the affect 
heuristic model (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Slovic, 
Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005) both posit that affective states shape perceptions of 
inherent risk and benefit in different activities. Indeed, correlational evidence suggests that 
participants tend to conflate their affect toward an activity with its risks and benefits (Alhakami 
& Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000). 
In one study, participants judged the risks and benefits of a variety of different activities 
that many people engage in (e.g., using nuclear power, taking prescription medications, getting 
vaccinated, getting an x-ray; Alhakami & Slovic, 1994). The researchers also asked participants 
to make judgments about the positivity or negativity of these activities using 7-point semantic 
differential scales with anchors such as “Good” vs. “Bad” and “Harmful” vs. “Beneficial.” The 
researchers found that judgments of risk and benefit were inversely related, such that activities 
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judged to be high risk were also judged to be low in benefit and vice versa. Further, participants’ 
affective reactions predicted the degree to which they perceived the risk and benefit of an 
activity as being inversely related. The strongest inverse relationship between perceived risk and 
perceived benefit were for activities that evoked the greatest negative affect in participants. 
Participants’ perceptions of risk and benefit in certain activities (e.g., using nuclear power) 
appear to be world-focused experiences of their affect. 
Similarly, experimental studies have found that experiences of certain negative emotions 
(e.g., fear, anger) can influence participants’ perceptions of risk (e.g., Lerner et al., 2003; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001). In one study, participants were induced to feel either fear or anger (Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001). In the fear condition, participants wrote about things that made them afraid, 
whereas in the anger condition, participants wrote about things that made them feel angry. 
Afterward, participants rated the likelihood that they would experience positive (e.g., I married 
someone wealthy) and negative (e.g., I divorce within 7 years after marrying) events. 
Participants also made judgments about the controllability and certainty of events they listed. 
Participants in fear condition, compared to the anger condition, tended to over-perceive risk and 
judged positive events as less likely and negative events as more likely. Further, participants in 
the fear condition tended to judge events as being less controllable and less predictable. Thus, 
participants experienced their emotions as world-focused perceptions of seemingly objective 
properties in the world (e.g., the likelihood, controllability, and predictability of events). 
 Together, research on intergroup bias (Awad et al., 2005; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; 
Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2004; Hutchings & Haddock, 
2008; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Little et al., 1998; McConahay, 1983; Sears et al., 1979; Shapiro et 
al., 2009) and judgment and decision making (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; 
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Lerner et al., 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Slovic et al., 1991) both suggest that affect can be 
experienced as world-focused as well as self-focused. However, this suggestive evidence does 
not provide insight into the mechanisms by which self-focused vs. world-focused affect arise. 
Further, the prior work does not compare the influence of self-focused affect vs. world-focused 
affect on subjective experiences or behavior. The psychological constructionist perspective (e.g., 
Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012; Lindquist, 2013) provides hypotheses about the underlying 
mechanisms behind self-focused vs. world-focused affect. Further, a psychological 
constructionist perspective also offers hypotheses about the effects self-focused vs. world-
focused affect have on subjective experiences and behaviors. 
Psychological Construction of Emotion 
 Psychological constructionist models of emotion posit that perceivers construct 
experiences of emotion from general positive or negative affect (Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012, 
Lindquist, 2013). In particular, these models hypothesize that perceivers continuously and 
automatically use domain general processes such as core affect, conceptualization, and attention 
to construct more complex mental states in relation to a given context. 
Core affect. Core affect refers to mental representations of the body’s homoeostatic state 
(Barrett, 2006, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999). Core 
affect often manifests as a feeling of positivity or negativity (i.e., affective valence) with some 
degree of arousal. Core affective experiences may also involve feeling bodily symptoms such as 
a knot in one’s stomach or a racing heartbeat (Lindquist, 2013). Although core affect is always 
present and continuously in flux, it often resides in the background of subjective experience 
(Barrett, 2006, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009). However, one’s core affective 
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state may sometimes come into the foreground of attention, such as during particularly intense 
affective experiences. 
Core affect changes in relation to changes in one’s internal body state and external 
environment (Barrett, 2006, 2012; Lindquist, 2013; Russell, 2003, 2005; Russell & Barrett, 
1999). Although such changes do not need to be “about” anything, core affect often provides 
evaluative information about events. For instance, perceivers may attribute changes in their core 
affective state to a situation (e.g., seeing a snake). Changes in core affect in response to an event 
are typically produced by a learned association between the event and its significance for an 
organism’s well-being. As such, affective associations allow perceivers to form a crude 
prediction of whether a stimulus or event is good or bad for one’s homeostatic state. For 
example, an association between snakes and harm results in negative affect when encountering a 
snake. Thus, core affect provides evaluative information that forms the basis for experiences of 
emotion, as well as other evaluative states (e.g., attitudes, risk assessment, decision-making; 
Barrett, 2009; Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel & Damasio, 1997; 
Cabanac, 2002; Cunningham & Zelazo, 2007; Damasio, 1994; Wundt, 1998). 
Conceptualization. During conceptualization, perceivers make meaning of changes in 
core affect by drawing on concept knowledge to construct an experience of emotion. Concept 
knowledge about emotion refers knowledge about different emotion categories (e.g., fear, 
disgust, joy, hate, envy, etc.; Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012; Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist & Barrett, 
2008). This knowledge is represented as sensorimotor simulations of emotion experiences 
acquired through either direct experience or social transmission (e.g., direct instruction, 
observational learning; Barrett, 2012, 2014). Emotion concept knowledge may include 
representations of the subjective experiences, physiological changes, behaviors, and eliciting 
   
  11 
situations associated with those emotion categories. For example, one’s concept knowledge 
about fear may include experiences of high arousal negative affect, increased vigilance to the 
environment, elevated heart rate, an inclination to flee, and dark alleyways. One’s concept 
knowledge about fear might also include a feeling of dread, sweaty palms, averting one’s eyes, 
and a killer clown in a made-for-TV horror movie. Thus, concept knowledge about an emotion 
category is a heterogeneous collection of representations associated with that emotion category 
rather than a prototypical representation of an emotion (Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012; Lindquist, 
2013). 
In conceptualization, perceivers use concept knowledge stored in memory to generate 
simulations of alternative scenarios about the present situation and make predictions about the 
future (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Bar, 2007, 2009; Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007, 
2008). Conceptualization occurs automatically and continuously during subjective experiences 
(Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2014; Barsalou, 2003, 2005, 2008; Barsalou, 
Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003; Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett, Simmons, & Barsalou, 2011). 
Predictions generated through conceptualization enable the maintenance of the body’s 
homeostatic state. Consequently, conceptualizing core affect as an instance of discrete emotion 
can produce subsequent changes in behavior, physiology, and subjective experience. 
For example, in one study, researchers primed participants with concept knowledge about 
fear vs. anger (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). Participants saw a picture of a conversation in which 
one man appeared afraid and the other man appeared angry. Participants in the fear condition 
came up with a story about the frightened man. Participants in the anger condition came up with 
a story about the angry man. Afterward, the researchers administered a negative vs. neutral affect 
induction. Participants in the negative affect condition listened to music found to induce high 
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arousal negative affect, while they imagined a highly unpleasant scenario. Participants in the 
neutral condition listened to music found to induce a relatively neutral state, while they imagined 
a neutral scenario. Finally, as an indirect measure of world-focused fear, participants made 
judgments about whether they would engage in different risky behaviors (e.g., binge drinking). 
Participants endorsed the fewest risky behaviors in the negative affect condition, but only if they 
were also primed with fear rather than anger. Priming participants’ concept knowledge about fear 
increased the degree to which they perceived risk in different activities. This study offers an 
example of how accessible concept knowledge about fear shaped how participants 
conceptualized their negative affect. In turn, participants’ conceptualizations of fear influenced 
their subjective experiences. 
Conceptualization is involved in other mental states beyond affective experience. 
Evidence for conceptualization also comes from research on visual perception. Studies suggest 
that visual processing draws on concept knowledge to facilitate organization of visual sensations 
into a unified whole. In the early stages of visual processing, perceivers extract salient cues from 
a scene (e.g., the background; Fink et al., 1996; Schyns & Oliva, 1994). These cues prime 
concept knowledge related to the scene (Aminoff, Gronau, & Bar, 2007; Bar & Aminoff, 2003; 
Chaumon, Kveraga, Barrett, & Bar, 2014). For example, cues from the background of a scene 
(e.g., a cathedral) may prime representations of priests, pews, altars, etc. Primed concept 
knowledge is used to generate predictions of visual sensations that influence further processing 
of additional visual inputs. Predictions generated using concept knowledge likely make visual 
processing more efficient at the cost of generating more errors. 
In an illustrative study, researchers presented scenes involving backgrounds that were 
either congruent (e.g., a cathedral) or incongruent (e.g., a football field) with the focal figure in 
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the scene (e.g., a priest; Davenport & Potter, 2004). Participants made fewer errors in their 
judgments when identifying targets in scenes with congruent, rather than incongruent, 
backgrounds. The results of the study show that participants used cues from the background to 
facilitate identification of the focal figure. Cues priming concept knowledge related to the focal 
figure enhanced the performance of participants, while cues priming concept knowledge 
unrelated to the focal figure impaired their performance. Thus, concept knowledge primed by 
cues in a scene influences what the perceiver sees, just as priming concept knowledge about an 
emotion category (e.g., fear vs. anger) influences whether a perceiver constructs an instance of 
fear or anger from negative affect (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). 
Attention. In psychological constructionist theories of emotion, attention plays an 
important role in determining how perceivers conceptualize their core affective sensations 
(Barrett, 2006, 2009, 2012, 2013, 2014; Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Lindquist, 2013; 
Lindquist et al. 2012). Different features of a situation may prime different sets of concept 
knowledge. As such, attention to some features of a situation over others may determine the 
concept knowledge that perceivers use for conceptualization (Barrett, 2009; Barrett et al., 2004; 
Lindquist et al., 2012). For example, after being cut off in traffic, one might focus on the 
transgression, which may activate concept knowledge related to anger. As a result, a perceiver 
might construct an experience of anger. Alternatively, the same perceiver might focus on the fact 
that no one was hurt and no damage was incurred, which may prime concept knowledge related 
to relief. In that case, the perceiver might construct an experience of relief. Further, as attention 
to different features of the situation shift, so might the sets of active concept knowledge. A 
perceiver’s experience might shift from anger to relief or vice versa. 
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Similarly, attention might be focused one’s bodily state (e.g., rapid heartbeat; i.e., core 
affect) or the external world (e.g., a dark alley). Consequently, perceivers may conceptualize 
their affect as self-focused vs world-focused depending on where attention is directed. When 
core affective sensations are in the foreground of attention, perceivers may construct an 
experience of self-focused affect (Barrett et al., 2007; Lindquist, 2013). Further, because 
attention is directed at core affect, perceivers may be more likely to recognize self-focused affect 
as an affective state. As a result, they may be more likely to regulate self-focused affect, 
compared to world-focused affect. This prediction is consistent with Lindquist (2013), who 
predicts that individuals who tend to experience their affect as self-focused may be better at 
emotion regulation. 
In contrast, when stimuli from the external world are in the foreground of attention, 
perceivers may construct an experience of world-focused affect (Barrett et al., 2007). They may 
experience their affect as a perception of some property in the world. Because attention is 
directed at the external world, perceivers are less likely to recognize an instance of world-focus 
affect as an affective state. Further, world-focused affect may be experienced with more urgency 
and result in more reflexive behavior. The reason is that world-focused fear may give perceivers 
the impression that there is something “real” in the world (e.g., threat) that affords a response 
(e.g., avoidance). 
As of yet, no published empirical research has directly tested the hypothesis that attention 
gives rise to self-focused vs. world-focused affect. However, studies from the affect labeling 
literature (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski, Lieberman, & Craske, 2012; Tabibnia, 
Lieberman, & Craske, 2008) do provide evidence that directing attention to one’s affective state 
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alters affective experience. These studies demonstrate that labeling one’s affective experiences 
decreases the intensity of those experiences. 
One study examined the role of affect labeling on physiological responses (Kassam & 
Mendes, 2013). The participants were randomly assigned to a “label” condition, in which they 
reported emotions they felt, or to a “no label” condition, in which they completed a neutral 
questionnaire unrelated to their emotions. Afterward, participants completed a difficult 
arithmetic task: counting backwards from five-digit numbers in intervals of seven. For this task, 
the researchers randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions. In the neutral 
condition, participants completed the task via prompts on a computer. In the anger condition, an 
experimenter provided negative feedback in a critical tone as participants completed the task. In 
the shame condition, an experimenter provided negative feedback in a supportive tone as 
participants completed the task. The researchers measured participants’ cardiac reactivity during 
the task as an index of physiological arousal. 
Participants who reported their emotions showed less cardiac reactivity in the anger 
condition, compared to participants who did not report their emotions (Kassam & Mendes, 
2013). However, participants who reported their emotions did not differ from participants who 
did not report their emotions in the neutral or shame conditions. This study demonstrates that 
drawing participants’ attention to their affect through affect labeling decreased physiological 
arousal. 
In another study, researchers examined how affect labeling influenced spider-phobic 
participants’ ability to habituate to frightening stimuli (i.e., spiders; Kircanski et al., 2012). In the 
experiment, participants sat next to a clear case containing a live tarantula and were randomly 
assigned to one of four activities. For the affect-labeling activity, participants described their 
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affect and the spider using negative words. For the reappraisal activity, participants described 
reasons they should not be afraid of the spider using neutral words. For the distraction activity, 
participants described objects or furniture found in their home. Finally, for the control activity, 
participants did nothing as they sat beside the spider.  
On each trial in the experimental task, participants were cued by a tone to complete their 
assigned activity. Participants completed a total of 10 trials. Afterward, participants completed 
two follow-up sessions that were identical to the first session. The first follow-up occurred the 
day after the first session. The second follow-up occurred one week after the first follow-up 
session. The researchers measured skin conductance during the experimental task in each 
session. 
In their analyses, the researchers computed changes scores for skin conductance across 
the three different sessions (Kircanski et al., 2012). The researchers then compared changes in 
skin conductance across conditions. Although there were no differences between conditions in 
skin conductance between the initial laboratory visit and the first follow-up session, participants 
in the affect-labeling condition showed greater decreases in the magnitude of their skin 
conductance between the first and second follow-up sessions. Changes in skin conductance were 
not different between any of the other conditions. The results of this study provide additional 
evidence that making affect self-focused may dampen the intensity of that affect. 
Studies of affect labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et 
al., 2008) offer some evidence that directing attention to one’s affective state results in self-
focused affect that is experienced with less intensity. However, a comparison to world-focused 
affect is needed to demonstrate that attention determines whether affect is self-focused vs. world-
focused. 
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The Present Studies 
Drawing from psychological constructionist models of emotion (e.g., Barrett, 2006, 2009, 
2012; Lindquist, 2013), I conducted three studies to examine whether self-focused affect vs. 
world-focused affect would differ in subjective experience and associated behaviors. I also 
examined whether attention is a key mechanism that determines whether affect is experienced as 
self-focused or world-focused. Study 1 examined whether self-focused affect would be 
experienced less intensely compared to world-focused affect using self-reported fear of different 
risky activities. I also examined whether self-focused affect or world-focused affect would better 
predict behavioral likelihood ratings related to those activities. Study 2 examined whether 
making self-focused vs. world-focused fear judgments would change participants’ explicit 
evaluations of fear-related stimuli. I also examined participants’ reaction times as a more indirect 
measure to assess whether making self-focused fear judgments would be more associated with 
reflection compared to making world-focused fear judgments. Finally, Study 3 examined 
whether world-focused fear was more associated with behavioral avoidance than self-focused 
fear by manipulating whether participants directed their attention to an aversive stimulus vs. their 
affective state. 
  
   




The purpose of Study 1 was to provide initial evidence that self-focused and world-
focused affect are similar, yet distinct, ways in which perceivers can experience their affect. In 
Study 1, participants provided both self-focused and world-focused ratings about different 
situations (e.g., air travel, smoking, taking prescription medication, using nuclear power). These 
situations were drawn from prior research on risk perception (cf. Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; 
Finucane et al., 2000). Participants also completed a behavioral intention measure in which they 
indicated how likely they would be to engage in behaviors related to those situations. Study 1 
used a within-subjects design. 
Research on affect labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et 
al., 2008) suggest that self-focused affect would be experienced less intensely than world-
focused affect. As a result, I predicted that participants’ self-focused fear ratings would be, on 
average, lower than their world-focused fear ratings. I also predicted that world-focused affect 
may be more likely to prompt behavior (Barrett et al., 2007). One reason may be that world-
focused affect may be more experienced with more urgency because perceivers experience their 
affect as a property in the world that affords a response (e.g., danger). Thus, I also predicted that 
participants’ world-focused fear ratings may be more related to behavior than their self-focused 
fear ratings. 
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Method 
Participants. I recruited 201 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants 
completed the study in exchange for $0.50. The sample consisted of 93 female participants (108 
males), who ranged from 20 to 62 years of age (M = 33.32, SD = 10.01). 
Procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were directed to an online 
survey. Participants read about 29 activities that varied in level of risk (e.g., riding in a car, 
eating beef, smoking, using nuclear power). In the self-focused block, participants provided self-
focused ratings about how “afraid,” “frightened,” and “scared” they were of each activity. 
Participants made their ratings using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely). 
In the world-focused block, participants provided world-focused ratings about how “dangerous,” 
“risky,” and “threatening” each situation was. Participants also used the same 5-point scale to 
make world-focused ratings. Once participants completed one block, they were presented with 
the other block. Block order was randomized. 
After making self-focused and world-focused ratings, participants then completed a 
measure of behavioral intentions. Participants provided ratings of how likely they were to engage 
in the 29 activities they just rated (e.g., eat beef, smoke a cigarette, support construction of a 
nuclear power plant). Participants responded using a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (Not at all 
likely) to 5 (Extremely likely). Afterward, participants were directed to a debriefing form. 
Results and Discussion 
Based on prior theoretical work (Lindquist, 2013) and empirical research on affect 
labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008), I predicted that 
participants would making less intense ratings of self-focused fear compared to world-focused 
fear. To test this prediction, I first computed overall scores for self-focused fear and world-
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focused fear by taking the mean ratings of self-focused ratings and world-focused ratings, 
respectively. Then, I conducted a paired-samples t-test. Participants endorsed less self-focused 
fear (M = 1.91, SD = .62) than world-focused fear (M = 2.17, SD = .58), t (200) = 10.69, p < 
.001, Cohen’s dav = .58 (see Figure 1). Consistent with prior theoretical and empirical work, this 




Figure 1. Average fear ratings across situations by condition. Error bars reflect 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
I also predicted that world-focused affect may be more related to behavior than self-
focused affect. To test this prediction, I examined the relationship between behavior likelihood 
ratings, self-focused fear, and world-focused fear. There was a strong, positive relationship 
between self-focused fear and world-focused fear, r = .84, p < .001. Further, behavior likelihood 
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ratings had weak negative relationships with both self-focused fear, r = -.22, p = .002, and world-
focused fear, r = -.28, p < .001. Next, I conducted a regression analysis in order to determine 
whether self-focused fear or world focused fear would be a better predictor of behavior. I 
regressed behavior likelihood ratings onto self-focused fear and world-focused fear.  World-
focused fear uniquely predicted behavior likelihood ratings, β = -.34, t (200) = 2.71, p = .007, 
95% CI [-.66, -.10], whereas self-focused fear did not, β = .07, t (200) = .55, p = .58, 95% CI [ 
-.19, .33]. However, the tolerance value was .30, which indicates that only 30% of the variance 
in world-focused fear cannot be explained by the self-focused fear. These results suggest that 
multicollinearity may be a concern. Among predictors that are highly positively correlated, 
multicollinearity in a regression analysis can lead to overestimation of slope of one predictor and 
lead to the underestimation of the other predictor. Thus, these results should be interpreted with 
caution. 
 Study 1 provides initial evidence that self-focused and world-focused affect may be 
distinct ways of experiencing an affective state. Participants made higher ratings of world-
focused affect compared to self-focused affect to different activities. These findings are 
consistent with prior work on affect labeling that suggests directing attention to one’s affective 
state (i.e., self-focused attention) may decrease the intensity of an affective experience (Kassam 
& Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008). However, one limitation was that 
Study 1 relied exclusively on self-report measures. To overcome the limitations of self-report, in 
Study 2 I used both explicit and more implicit measures to examine differences in the subjective 
experiences associated with self-focused fear vs. world-focused fear. Moreover, another 
limitation is related to concerns regarding multicollinearity between measures of self-focused 
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and world-focused affect. Study 2 also sought to address these limitations by manipulating self-
focus and world-focus experimentally. 
  
   




In Study 2, I examined how self-focused vs. world-focused affect shaped participants’ 
evaluations of fear-related stimuli. As an explicit measure, I examined participants’ self-focused 
and world-focused judgments of high-intensity and low-intensity fear images, and neutral 
images. As suggested by the results of Study 1 and affect labeling studies (Kassam & Mendes, 
2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008), I predicted that participants may experience 
fear less intensely in the self-focused (vs. world-focused) condition. As a result, participants in 
the self-focused condition may be less likely to feel frightened of a fear-related image, and thus 
be less likely to judge the image as fear-related. Moreover, low-intensity fear images may be 
more ambiguous in signal strength relative to high-intensity fear images. Thus, I predicted that 
the proportion of fear judgments of low-intensity fear images would be closer to the proportion 
of fear judgments to neutral, rather than high-intensity fear images.  
Conversely, in the world-focused condition, participants may experience fear more 
intensely, as suggested by Study 1. In turn, participants might be more likely to perceive a low-
intensity fear image as frightening and thus be more likely to judge the image as fear-related. 
Thus, in the world-focused condition, I predicted that the proportion of participants’ fear 
judgements of low-intensity fear images may be closer their judgments of high-intensity fear 
images compared to neutral images. 
As a more implicit measure, I also examined the reaction times of participants’ judgments 
of self-focused vs. world-focused fear. Self-focused affect may be more likely to prompt 
reflection (Lindquist, 2013), which may result in slower judgments of fear-related images. In 
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contrast, world-focused affect may be experienced with more urgency and thus may be more 
likely to prompt a behavioral response, and thus faster judgments, compared to self-focused 
affect. 
Method 
Participants and design. I recruited 214 online participants1 from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Participants received $0.75 in compensation for their participation. One participant was 
excluded for not following instructions and pressing the same key on every trial of the 
experimental task. Of these participants, 96 participants were female (91 males, and 1 participant 
opted not to respond), with ages ranging from 19 to 75 years of age (M = 39.81, SD = 12.23). 
Twenty-five participants did not provide demographics information. 
The design of the study was a 2 (Condition: Self-focused vs. World-focused) x 3 (Image 
type: High fear vs. Low fear vs. Neutral) factorial with both factors manipulated within subjects. 
Procedure. After participants provided informed consent, they were directed to the 
experimental task via a link. In the task, participants saw high-intensity fear, low-intensity fear, 
and neutral images selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) based on data from prior research (Mikels et al., 2005) and on data 
from a pilot study. In total, there were 120 images (40 high fear, 40 low fear, 40 neutral). In the 
self-focused block, participants made judgments about whether “I am frightened” or “I am not 
frightened” in response to the images. In the world-focused block, participants made judgments 
about whether images were “Frightening” or “Not frightening.” In both blocks, participants 
                                                          
1 The raw data contained 220 responses, however examining participants’ Amazon Mechanical 
Turk IDs revealed that 6 of these responses were duplicate responses. For these participants, I 
included only their first responses. 
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pressed one key (e.g., “P”) to make a fear judgment and another key (“Q”) to make a non-fear 
judgment. The blocks were presented in random order. 
Data Preparation. I excluded reaction time responses that were below 300ms as they 
were implausibly short (see Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Additionally, I imposed a maximum 
cutoff of 2500ms2 determined by visual inspection of the distribution of the data. The cutoffs 
excluded 8% of the total responses. I applied an absolute cutoff because of a large number of 
implausibly long responses (>10000ms) that resulted in a large range (571604ms). Moreover, I 
used an absolute cutoff rather than standard deviations because of the large standard deviation in 
reaction times (4065.80ms) even after responses below 300ms were excluded. I also examined 
only congruent responses (i.e., fear judgments of fear-related images). 
Results and Discussion 
I predicted that participants would make a smaller proportion of self-focused compared to 
world-focused fear judgments, but that this would be more pronounced for low (vs. high) fear 
images. To test this prediction, I conducted at 2 (Condition: Self-focused vs. World-focused) x 3 
(Image type: High fear vs. Low fear vs. Neutral) repeated measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA).3 A main effect of condition revealed that participants made a smaller proportion of 
                                                          
2 Prior work has demonstrated that absolute cutoffs for reaction time data do not affect the Type I 
error rate, but do risk reducing power if the effects of interest are intermixed with outliers in the 
tails of the distribution of the data (Ratcliff, 1993; see also Whelan, 2008). However, it is 
unlikely that genuine effects were excluded by the 2500ms cutoff. On average, participants take 
less than a second to make valence judgments of IAPS images (Calvo & Avero, 2009). Thus, a 
2500ms window offers ample time for participants to make affective judgments, while still 
making it likely that participants’ responses reflect automatic, rather than controlled processes. 
 
 
3 I also ran analyses comparing participants’ fear-related judgments between all fear images and 
neutral images by condition. I found a significant two way Condition x Image Type interaction 
(p < .001). Participants made more world-focused (vs. self-focused) fear judgments for fear 
images (p < .001), but not neutral images (p = .76). 
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self-focused compared to world-focused fear judgments, F (1, 212) = 16.52, p < .001, η2 = .07. I 
also found a main effect of image type, F (2, 424) = 895.93, p < .001, η2 = .81. Importantly, I 
found a significant interaction between condition and image type, F (2, 424) = 8.62, p = .001, η2 
= .04. 
To probe the interaction, I conducted follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs collapsing 
across image type. The interaction was likely driven by judgments of neutral images in contrast 
to judgments of fear images. Participants did not differ in the proportions of their judgments of 
self-focused fear (M = .06, SD = .13) or world-focused fear (M = .06, SD = .15) of neutral 
images, F (1, 212) = .09, p = .76, η2 = <.001. Examining only responses to fear images, the two-
way interaction between condition (Self-focused vs. World-focused) and image type (High fear 
vs. Low fear), was not significant, F (1, 212) = .71, p = .40, η2 = .003. However, the main effect 
of condition was significant, F (1, 212) = 17.65, p < .001, η2 = .08. Participants made fewer self-
focused fear judgments compared to world-focused fear judgments regardless of whether the fear 
images were relatively high or low in intensity (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Average proportion of “fear-related” judgments by condition and image type. 
Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
 
I also predicted that participants would take longer to respond to fear-related images in 
the self-focused vs. world-focused condition. To test this prediction, I conducted at 2 (Condition: 
Self-focused vs. World-focused) x 3 (Image type: High fear vs. Low fear, vs. Neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA to examine participants’ average reaction times.4 I found a marginally 
significant main effect of condition such that participants were slower to make self-focused fear 
judgments compared to world-focused fear judgments, F (1, 194) = 3.78, p = .05, η2 = .02. There 
was also a main effect of image type, F (2, 386) = 46.59, p < .001, η2 = .19. Importantly, I found 
                                                          
4 As with participants’ judgments, I also compared participants’ reaction times for congruent judgments between all 
fear images vs. neutral images. The two way Condition x Image Type interaction was marginally significant (p = 
.05). However, the difference in response time only trended such that participants were slightly faster to make 
congruent world-focused compared to congruent self-focused judgments for fear images (p = .08). In contrast, 
reaction times for congruent judgments of neutral images did not differ by condition (p = .67). 
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the predicted two-way interaction between condition and image type, F (2, 386) = 3.92, p = .02, 
η2 = .02. 
To probe the significant two-way interaction, I conducted follow-up ANOVAs collapsing 
across image type. As with participants’ judgments, the two-way interaction for reaction time 
was likely driven by the differences in participants responses to neutral images vs. fear images. 
Examining neutral images, participants’ reaction times for their self-focused fear (M = 850.00ms, 
SD = 228.64ms) and world-focused fear judgments (M = 842.65ms, SD = 227.31ms) were not 
significantly different, F (1, 207) = .18, p = .69, η2 = .001. Examining only fear images, the two-
way interaction between condition (Self-focused vs. World-focused) and image type (High fear 
vs. Low fear) was not significant, F (1, 195) = 1.13, p = .29, η2 = .001. However, there was a 
significant main effect of condition, F (1, 195) = 5.45, p = .02, η2 = .03. Participants were slower 
to make self-focused fear judgments compared to world-focused fear judgments regardless of 
whether the fear images were relatively high or low in intensity (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Average reaction time for congruent judgments by condition and image type in 
milliseconds. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The results offer partial support for my predictions. Participants in the self-focused 
condition were less likely to make fear judgments compared to participants in the world-focused 
condition. However, this was true regardless of whether the fear-related image was relatively 
intense or not. The differences in participants’ judgments may be because self-focused fear may 
be experienced less intensely compared to world-focused fear as suggested by Study 1 and the 
affect labeling literature (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008). 
I also found that participants were slower to make self-focused judgments compared to world-
focused judgments for fear images. These findings suggest that participants may be relatively 
more reflective in their self-focused, compared to world-focused evaluations. To the extent that 
participants are reflecting on their self-focused affect, they may be more likely to prompt 
regulation because participants recognize that they are having an affective experience. Such a 
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finding is consistent with prior empirical research in affect labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; 
Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008) as well as theoretical work from psychological 
constructionist model (Lindquist, 2013).  
One limitation of Study 2 is that it did not necessarily address the prediction that while 
self-focused affect might prompt regulation, world-focused affect is more likely to prompt 
reflexive behavior (e.g., avoidance). In part, this is because Study 2 did not include a behavioral 
measure. Similarly, although I measured behavior intentions in Study 1, concerns with 
multicollinearity limit the interpretation of the finding that only world-focused affect uniquely 
predicted behavioral intentions. Moreover, Studies 1 and 2 also do not directly test whether 
attention is a key mechanism that gives rise to self-focused vs. world-focused affect. To address 
these limitations I conducted Study 3, which in which I experimentally manipulated participants’ 
attention and examined the impact on behavioral avoidance. 
  
   




In Study 3, I examined whether self-focused affect is more likely to prompt regulation 
(Lindquist, 2013) and world-focused affect is more likely to prompt behavioral avoidance 
(Barrett et al., 2007). In Study 3, I also tested whether differences in attention lead to the 
construction of self-focused vs. world-focused experiences of affect. When attention is directed 
to core affective sensations, perceivers may be more likely to construct an experience of self-
focused affect (Barrett, 2006, 2009; Barrett et al., 2007). Conversely, when attention is directed 
at the stimulus, perceivers are likely to construct an experience of world-focused affect 
(experienced as “perception”). Although no work has directly tested the hypothesis that self-
focused and world-focused affect influence behavior differently, prior research suggests that 
changing how participants interpret their affect influences the mental states and behaviors that 
may arise from affective sensations (e.g., Cooley, Loersch, Payne, & Lei, 2015; Cooley, Payne, 
& Phillips, 2014; Lee, Lindquist, & Payne, 2018; Schachter & Singer, 1962; Schwarz & Clore, 
1983). 
Studies show that manipulating how participants conceptualize their core affective 
sensations has downstream consequences for affective experiences (Lee et al., 2018; Lindquist & 
Barrett, 2008). For example, in one line of research, I found that White participants completed an 
implicit measure of negative affect toward Black Americans (Lee et al., 2018). Afterward, 
researchers encouraged participants, in one group, to conceptualize their affect as an instance of 
sympathy and encouraged participants, in another group, to conceptualize their affect as an 
instance of fear. Participants then provided self-reported ratings of fear toward Black Americans. 
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Participants with greater negative affect tended to endorse more fear of Black Americans in the 
fear group, but not in the sympathy group. Conceptualization of affect as sympathy, rather than 
fear, influenced whether participants constructed an experience of fear from their negative affect. 
In a follow up study using perceptual and psychophysiological measures, I similarly found that 
conceptualization of negative affect as sympathy disrupted the link between participants’ 
negative affect and perceived threat on the faces of Black Americans. Additionally, participants 
in the sympathy condition showed decreased skin conductance in response to faces of Black 
Americans compared to participants in the fear condition. Thus, manipulating how participants 
are likely to conceptualize their affect can influence the downstream consequences of their core 
affective responses.  
In Study 3, I prompted participants to direct their attention to either their core affect (i.e., 
bodily reactions) or stimuli themselves (i.e., features of emotional images) to influence how 
participants conceptualized their affect. Further, on each trial, participants received a reminder to 
focus on their bodily reactions or on the features of the stimulus. Afterward, participants saw an 
aversive image on a computer screen. Participants could expend effort to avoid the image by 
clicking on the image to briefly remove the image from the screen. 
Prior theory predicts that self-focused affect may be likely to involve greater regulation 
of affect, but less behavioral avoidance. One reason for this may be that participants recognize 
that negative affect evoked by the aversive image reflects an affective experience that they can 
regulate (Lindquist, 2013). Another reason that the self-focused condition may be less likely to 
produce effortful avoidance may be that self-focused affect is experienced less intensely and thus 
is more tolerable. This second possibility is suggested by Study 1 and by research demonstrating 
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that labeling one’s affective state can diminish the intensity of one’s affective experiences 
(Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008).  
In contrast, compared to self-focused affect, world-focused affect may be more likely to 
prompt active avoidance (Barrett et al., 2007; Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002). This may 
be because world-focused affect is experienced as a perceived property in the world that affords 
as response. Thus, I predicted that in the self-focused (vs world-focused) condition participants 
would make a fewer number of clicks per trial. Moreover, while in the self-focused (vs. world-
focused) condition, even if participants engage in active avoidance, they may engage in more 
reflection and thus be slower to decide to avoid the aversive images (i.e., longer response). 
Method 
 Participants and design. I recruited 350 psychology undergraduate students, who 
completed the study in exchange for partial course credit. However, data from 11 participants 
were not recorded or incomplete due to computer error. Thus, 339 participants were included in 
analyses. The design of the study was a 2 (Condition: World-focused vs. Self-focused) x 2 
(Image type: Aversive vs. Neutral) factorial design with both factors manipulated within 
subjects. Demographic information was not collected. 
 Procedure. Upon entering the laboratory, each participant was seated at a computer with 
a partition. Up to six participants completed the study at a time. After participants provided 
informed consent, they completed the experimental task. On each trial, participant saw either an 
aversive or neutral image. Participants could choose to either look at the image or click on the 
image to make it disappear for 2s, after which it would reappear. The image disappeared for the 
rest of the trial after 10 clicks. Thus, participants could make between 0 to 10 clicks. Each trial 
lasted for 25s. 
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In the self-focused block, participants were instructed to focus on their bodily reactions. 
Between each trial, participants saw a reminder to “Focus on your bodily reactions” that 
remained onscreen for 5s. Similarly, in the world-focused block, participants were instructed to 
focus on the features of the image. Between each trial, participants saw a reminder to “Focus on 
the picture” that remained onscreen for 5s. In each block, participants completed 25 trials with 
aversive images (e.g., bodily injury) and 25 trials with neutral images (e.g., animals, landscapes) 
for a total of 50 trials per block. 
As neutral and aversive stimuli, I selected 10 aversive and 10 neutral images from the 
IAPS (Lang et al., 2008). There were 5 aversive and 5 neutral images used in each block so the 
set of images in each block were different. I balanced images in each set by the valence based on 
data from a pilot study and validation data from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008). The set of images 
differed between blocks. Both block order and image sets were randomized. 
Data Preparation. Because I was interested in response times as a measure of effortful 
regulation, rather than as an implicit measure, I did not set an upper limit on participants’ 
response times for Study 3. Responses less than 300ms were trimmed (<1% of the total 
responses). 
Results and Discussion 
I predicted that participants in the self-focused, compared to world-focused, condition 
would engage in less effortful avoidance and thus make fewer clicks to aversive vs. neutral 
images. To test this prediction, I conducted a 2 (Condition: Self-focus vs. World-focus) x 2 
(Image type: Aversive vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. I found a marginally significant 
main effect of condition such that participants in the self-focused condition (M = 2.60, SD = 
3.19) made more clicks than in the world-focused condition (M = 2.33, SD = 3.02), F (1, 338) = 
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4.00, p = .05, η2 = .01. I also found a main effect of image type such that participants made more 
clicks in response to aversive (M = 3.13, SD = 3.32) compared to neutral images (M = 1.79, SD = 
2.75), F (1, 338) = 126.36, p < .001, η2 = .27. However, I did not find the predicted interaction 
between condition and image type, F (1, 338) = .88, p = .35, η2 = .003. 
 
 
Figure 4. Number of clicks made by condition and image type. Error bars reflect 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 
I also predicted that if participants in the self-focused condition made the decision to 
avoid an image, they would take longer to reach this decision compared to the world-focused 
condition. To test this prediction, I conducted a 2 (Condition: Self-focus vs. World-focus) x 2 
(Image type: Aversive vs. Neutral) repeated measures ANOVA examining participants’ initial 
response time. I did not find that the time it took for participants to make their response differed 
between the self-focused (M = 7.35, SD = 5.38s) and world-focused blocks (M = 7.41s, SD = 
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5.29s), F (1, 127) = 1.91, p = .17, η2 = .02. I did find that participants were faster to choose to 
avoid aversive (M = 6.78s, SD = 5.14s) compared to neutral images (M = 8.90s, SD = 6.46s), F 
(1, 127) = 25.86, p < .001, η2 = .17. However, I did not find the predicted interaction between 
condition and image type, F (1, 127) = .46, p = .50, η2 = .004. 
 
 
Figure 5. Average time (in seconds) that participants’ waited to make the first click on an 
image in seconds. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Contrary to what I predicted, I did not find evidence in participants’ behaviors or 
response times that participants in the self-focused condition were more likely to regulate their 
negative affect, rather than actively avoid aversive images compared to participants in the world-
focused condition. In fact, participants were more likely to engage in avoidance overall in the 
self-focused condition vs. the world-focused condition. These results seem to contradict the 
hypothesis that self-focused fear prompts regulation while world-focused fear prompts active 
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avoidance. However, an alternative explanation may be that Study 3 did not adequately 
disentangle regulation and behavior. For instance, participants in the self-focused condition 
might have engaged in more emotion regulation by actively avoiding the aversive stimulus (i.e., 
situation modification; Gross, 1998). Thus, future work must develop better ways to disentangle 
predictions that self-focused affect prompts reflection whereas world-focused affect prompts 
behavior. 
  
   




 Across 3 studies, I find evidence of differences in the experiences of self-focused vs. 
world-focused affect. In Study 1, I found self-report evidence that world-focused fear may be 
experienced more intensely. In Study 2, I found evidence that world-focused fear results in a 
greater likelihood of evaluating a stimulus as fear-related compared to self-focused fear. I also 
found some evidence that self-focused fear may be associated with more reflection whereas 
world-focused fear may result in more reflexive evaluations based on participants’ reaction 
times. However, in Study 3, I did not find that directing attention in a self-focused (i.e., bodily 
reactions) vs. world-focused way (i.e., features of the stimulus) results in differences in 
avoidance vs. regulation. 
 Although I did not find evidence of differences in behavioral avoidance, my findings 
offer evidence that self-focused vs. world-focused experiences of affect produce subtle, but 
potentially meaningful differences in how people experience their affect and the evaluations 
associated with that affect. These findings have important implications in the study and 
measurement of emotion across a variety of domains including affective science, stereotyping 
and prejudice, and risk perception. 
Implications for Affective Science 
The findings of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that by using measures that ask about emotion in 
self-focused ways, researchers may be unintentionally reducing the intensity of affective 
experiences and increasing the likelihood that participants may reflect on or regulate their affect. 
This interpretation is consistent with work in affect labeling suggesting that labeling an 
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experience of emotion decreases its intensity (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; 
Tabibnia et al., 2008). 
 Other research has similarly found that how researchers ask participants to evaluate 
affective stimuli can shape their subsequent experiences. Work in affective neuroscience has 
demonstrated that perceptions and neural representations of affective stimuli may change 
depending on the evaluations that participants are asked to make. For example, researchers have 
found that asking participants to make categorical compared to continuous judgments of 
affective images changes the extent to which participants’ perceptions and neural representations 
of their affective states (Satpute et al., 2016). The researchers showed participants neutral, mildly 
aversive, and highly aversive images. In one block, participants made categorical judgments 
about whether the images were good, neutral, or bad. In another block, participants made 
continuous judgments about the images on a good-to-bad continuum. The researchers calculated 
change scores that reflected whether making categorical vs. continuous judgments shifted the 
likelihood that the images would be judged negatively or positively for each participant. 
These changes in judgment were associated with differences in brain activity (Satpute et 
al., 2016). A tendency to make more negative categorical (vs. continuous) judgments was 
associated with greater activity in brain regions associated with processing salience of external 
stimuli (the amygdala; see Adolphs, 2010; Cunningham & Brosch, 2012; Lindquist et al., 2012 
for discussions) and with awareness of bodily sensations (the insula; see Craig 2002, 2009; 
Lindquist et al., 2012 for discussions). Further, a tendency to make more negative categorical 
(vs. continuous) judgments was also associated with greater connectivity between the amygdala 
and insula, and the medial prefrontal cortex, a region implicated in conceptualization (see 
Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). This change in connectivity between the medial prefrontal cortex, 
   
  40 
and the amygdala and the insula may reflect participants relying more on their concept 
knowledge when making more negative categorical evaluations. Thus, the types of judgments 
researchers ask people make about emotions may change both perceptions of affective stimuli, as 
well as their underlying neural representations. 
Implications for Stereotyping and Prejudice 
 My findings also suggest that having people think about outgroups in world-focused 
ways may have undesirable consequences. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that world-focused 
experiences of affect toward outgroups (e.g., as threats) may make it more likely that people 
make negative evaluations of outgroup members. Moreover, world-focused experiences of affect 
may intensify negative affect toward these outgroups. For instance, in another line of research, I 
offer evidence that world-focused concept knowledge about Black Americans moderates whether 
implicitly measured negative affect is associated with explicit negative attitudes toward Black 
Americans (Lee, Lindquist, & Payne, in prep). I drew on data from the 2008 American National 
Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Study, which included an implicit measure of affect 
toward Black Americans and an explicit attitude measure. The ANES dataset also included 
measures of symbolic racism and negative stereotyping, which tap into people’s world-focused 
concept knowledge about Black Americans. 
For example, as discussed in the introduction, the symbolic racism measure examined the 
degree to which people believe that Black Americans fail to live up to American values such as 
possessing a strong work ethic and being independent. Similarly, the negative stereotyping 
measure examined the degree to which people believed that Black Americans were unintelligent 
and lazy. These two measures offer information about concept knowledge that participants likely 
draw on when conceptualizing existing negative affect toward black Americans. Importantly, 
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these measure frame dislike of Black Americans as world-focused “un-American-ness,” 
stupidity, and laziness on the part of Black Americans. 
 My results revealed that participants’ implicit negative affect was more strongly 
associated with unfavorable explicit evaluations of Black Americans when they were high in 
symbolic racism. In contrast, the association between participants’ implicit negative affect and 
unfavorable explicit evaluations was much weaker in participants low in symbolic racism (Lee et 
al., in prep). I found parallel results for negative stereotyping. Participants’ implicit negative 
affect was more strongly associated with unfavorable explicit evaluations of Black Americans 
when participants had more negative stereotypes. However, the association between participants’ 
implicit negative affect and unfavorable explicit evaluations of Black Americans was weaker in 
participants who had fewer negative stereotypes. These results offer correlational evidence that 
people with world-focused beliefs about outgroups were more likely to construct explicit 
prejudice from negative affect toward those groups. Encouraging participants to construct more 
self-focused experiences of their negative affect toward outgroups might weaken the link 
between implicitly measured affect and explicit prejudice. 
Implications for Risk Perception 
Finally, related to the implications for affective science, how researchers ask participants 
to evaluate risk may influence measured perceptions of risk. Studies 1 and 2 suggest that framing 
the question in terms of risk, danger, or threat will increase likelihood that an activity will be 
judged as risky. In contrast, framing the question in terms of emotions (fear, anxiety, etc.) might 
reduce the likelihood that an event is judged as risky. These findings are inconsistent with the 
view that self-focused affect triggers world-focused affect (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001), which 
suggests that focusing on fear should actually make it more likely that an event is judged as 
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risky. Rather my results suggest that negative affect may be experienced as world focused fear 
(e.g., perceived risk). 
Importantly, whereas experts emphasize probabilistic judgments of likelihood of negative 
events (“Risk-as-analysis”), ordinary people often use their affective responses to stimuli to 
evaluation risk (“Risk-as-feelings”; Slovic et al., 2004). Because ordinary people rely on a risk-
as-feelings approach, they tend to under-perceive the benefits of risky activities that are often 
associated with negative affect (e.g., nuclear energy; Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Slovic 1996). 
Conversely, ordinary people tend to under-estimate the danger of beneficial activities (e.g., 
medical x-rays) that may also be high in risk because of the positive affect associated with the 
benefits. For instance, ordinary participants judged getting an x-ray as being much safer 
compared to nuclear energy (Slovic, 1996). In contrast, a group of experts judged medical x-rays 
as being much higher in risk compared to using nuclear power. 
Further, many studies have demonstrated that affective responses to potential negative or 
positive outcomes reduces sensitivity to the actual probability of those outcomes (e.g., Peters, 
Kunreuther, Sagara, Slovic, & Schley, 2012; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1992). For instance, in one study, participants reported being willing to pay a median price of $7 
to avoid a 1% chance of getting an electric shock and $10 to avoid a 99% chance of getting 
shocked (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). In contrast, participants were willing to pay a median 
price of $1 to avoid a 1% chance of losing $20, and $18 to avoid a 99% chance of losing $20. In 
other words, participants cared less about a 99-fold increase in the likelihood of an outcome 
happening when that outcome was more affectively charged (i.e., an electric shock vs. losing 
$20). 
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Enabling people to disentangle their affective reactions from probabilistic judgments of 
risky events may allow them to make more accurate evaluations of risk. My results suggest that 
one way to do so is to encourage people to construct self-focused experiences of affect. My 
research, as well as research on affect labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; 
Tabibnia et al., 2008) suggest that having self-focused experiences of emotion decrease the 
intensity of affective experiences. Moreover, making self-focused (vs. world-focused) judgments 
decreased the propensity to categorize aversive images as fear-related, but did not affect 
judgments of neutral images. These findings suggest that constructing self-focused experiences 
might decrease the influence affective experiences have on evaluations of threat and risk. 
Limitations 
 The findings of my studies must be understood within the context of the limitations of 
these studies. Based on prior work, I have suggested that affect labeling (Kassam & Mendes, 
2013; Kircanski et al., 2012; Tabibnia et al., 2008) and increased reflection and regulation 
(Lindquist, 2013) may both be mechanisms through which the intensity of self-focused affect is 
dampened compared to world-focused affect. However, one limitation of my studies is that they 
are not designed to adjudicate between these perspectives. Study 2 offers suggestive evidence 
that self-focused affect may be associated with more reflection in that participants tend to be 
slower to make self-focused fear judgments of fear-related images. However, the difference is 
relatively small and it is unclear whether any increased reflection might be due to affect labeling, 
directing attention to core affect, or some other process. Future work might more directly 
examine mechanisms that decrease the intensity of self-focused experiences of affect. 
 Another limitation is that because Study 3 did not include another measure of self-
focused and world-focused affect, it is unclear whether directing attention to core affect vs. 
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perceptual features gives rise to these different experiences of affect. One possibility is that 
directing attention toward core affect vs. perceptual features of the stimulus alone is not 
sufficient for participants to construct self-focused vs. world-focused experiences of affect.  
Another possibility is that while the attention manipulation may have led participants to 
construct self-focused vs. world-focused experiences of affect, these differences were not enough 
to result in behavioral avoidance. Studies 1 and 2 offered evidence that while self-focused and 
world-focused affect are associated with different subjective experiences and evaluations, these 
differences are also often subtle. Given that the relationship between affect and behavior is often 
tenuous (DeWall, Baumeister, Chester, & Bushman, 2015), a behavioral measure may not be an 
ideal way to test for differences between self-focused and world-focused affect. Instead, future 
work might use judgment tasks, perceptual measures, or neuroimaging to examine whether 
directing attention to core affect vs. an external stimulus can give rise to a self-focused vs. world-
focused experience of affect. 
Conclusions 
 Affective scientists (e.g., Barrett et al., 2007; Clore et al., 2001; Dewey, 1895; Lindquist, 
2013) and philosophers (e.g., Lambie, 2009; Lambie & Marcel, 2002) posit that affect can be 
experienced as self-focused or world-focused. Moreover, they predict that these different ways of 
experiencing affect have different implications for subjective experience and behavior. My 
research offers initial evidence for some of these predictions. My results suggest that self-
focused affect may be experienced less intensely than world-focused affect and may be more 
likely to prompt reflection and regulation. These findings have implications for how affective 
experiences and evaluations are studied. Researchers may want to incorporate more world-
focused measures when studying affective experience to avoid inadvertently dampening 
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participants’ affect. Moreover, researchers investigating intergroup bias, and judgment and 
decision-making may wish to examine whether the relationship between negative affect and 
increased perception of threat is mediated by world-focused vs. self-focused experiences of 
affect. 
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